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CLASS CERTIFICATION THROUGH 23(B)(3)
DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS - THE FINE
LINE BETWEEN CLASS-WIDE RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION AND ISOLATED INCIDENTS
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION - BROWN V.
NUCOR CORP., 785 F.3D 895 (4TH CIR. 2015).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(2) states that
members of a class may sue on behalf of all members if there are questions
of law or fact which are common to the class.1 Class action lawsuits may be
brought under Rule 23 if a commonality of fact or law exists within the class
that predominates over any matter that an individual may want to litigate on
their own.2 These class action lawsuits exist to benefit classes of wronged
people by providing accessibility and ensuring expediency.3 With that in
mind, a 23(a) class action suit is well suited for a group of individuals
pursuing a racial discrimination claim.'

1 See FED. R.

Civ. P. 23(a) (establishing requirements for class actions). Rule 23(a) dictates

that:

One or more member of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
Id.
2 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(b) (considering desirability of concentrating litigation to one forum).
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that a class representative must be part
of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. See also
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982); E. Tex. Motor Freight Syst., Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)). In East Texas Motor Freight, the class was improperly certified
because the named plaintiffs were not qualified for certain positions at East Texas Motor Freight
for which such positions the class action was brought. Id. at 403.
3 See Anderson v. Abbott, 61 F. Supp. 888, 902 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (stating individual member
of class may proceed for benefit of total class).
4 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 157 (noting distinction between ability to include
racial discrimination in complaint and ability to maintain action). The plaintiff in General
Telephone Company was a Mexican-American that alleged he was passed over for a promotion due
to his national origin and that the petitioner's promotion policy acted against Mexican-Americans
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The Supreme Court determined that the existence of racial
discrimination does not automatically qualify as class discrimination under
23(b).' For a discrimination to be certified as a class, the representative for
the class action must be able to prove more than the validity of her own
claim.6 The representative of a class must prove that discrimination exists in
a systemic manner affecting the class as a whole.7 Typically, courts look at
whether data used by a class representative is reliable and probative of
discrimination.8 In some class actions, the issues are apparent in the
pleadings to determine whether the claim fairly encompasses the absent
parties within the class, however, sometimes courts may find it necessary to
probe the pleadings before making a determination on class certification.9
Case law further explaining Federal Rule 23 requires that a plaintiff bear the
burden of demonstrating that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) are
met.o In addition, courts facing a class certification motion are required to

as a class. Id. at 149-51. "[The Supreme Court] also recognized the theory behind the Fifth Circuit's
across-the-board rule, noting our awareness that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are
often by their very nature class suits, involving class wide wrongs, and that [common] questions of
law or fact are typically present. Id. at 157. "In the same breath, however, [The Supreme Court]
reiterated that careful attention to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 remains
nonetheless indispensable." Id. The Supreme Court then states that the mere presence of a
complaint that alleges racial discrimination does not ensure that the moving party will be an
adequate representative of any real victims of discrimination. Id.
' See id. at 147 ("Racial discrimination is not by definition class discrimination. An allegation
that such discrimination has occurred neither determines whether a class action may be
maintained ... nor defines the class that may be certified.").
6 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. 457 U.S. at 160 (finding representative of class must carefully
apply 23(a) requirements and prove more than individual claim); see also Cooper & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 465 (1978) (explaining relationship between factual and legal issues). "The
class determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action. Id. at 469 (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)).
7 See Gen. Tel Co. ofthe Sw., 457 U.S. at 159 (stating representative's responsibility in finding
systemic discrimination before filing class action).
8 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 906 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding probative value of
information critical to meeting burden of proof). "The critical question is not whether the data used
is perfect for purposes of establishing commonality for class certification in a discrimination matter,
but instead whether it is reliable and probative of discrimination. To that end, a court must examine
whether any statistical assumptions made in the analysis are reasonable." Id at 904.
9 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 160 (stating need for rigorous analysis into factual
evidence put forth in pleadings). Further, a judge may freely modify the certification of the class
action throughout the trial if new evidence arises during the litigation process which would
decertify the class, leaving commonality an open question and not a standard that only needs to be
met once but continually satisfied. Id. at 160.
10 See United Steel v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating party
seeking class certification bears burden of meeting requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)); see also
Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst. Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating plaintiff must
meet Rule 23 requirements).
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conduct a rigorous analysis ensuring such requirements of Rule 23 are
satisfied."
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,12 the Supreme Court determined
that the plaintiffs of the class action were unable to meet the standard of
certification of Rule 23(b)(3) because of a lack of statistical and anecdotal
evidence." The Supreme Court was careful to note that for the commonality
of injury requirement to be met in a Rule 23(a) action does not mean that the
class must suffer a violation of the same provision of law, but that the act
causing the injury must be common among class. 14 The Fourth Circuit of
Appeals, with the ruling of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in mind, found that the
plaintiffs in Brown v. Nucor Corp. presented enough statistical evidence for
a class certification, reasoning that a lack of promotions for AfricanThis paper will focus on the
American employees was sufficient."
consistent reasoning in both Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes and Brown v. Nucor
Corp. and explore the fine-line which the holdings present when determining
16
what truly is an appropriate class action against discrimination.
II.

Corp. "

FACTS/PREMISE OF THE PAPER

This paper will focus on the issues presented in Brown v. Nucor
The case revolves around the certification of a class of African

" See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)
(warning of consequences of overbroad class certifications). In Johnson, the plaintiff was seeking
relief against limiting the use of company-maintained facilities on the basis of race or color. Id.
However, the plaintiff did not describe the facilities or the circumstances surrounding their use. Id.
The court in Johnson emphasized the need for more precise pleadings because without substantial
anecdotal evidence, both the court and the defendant cannot be sufficiently advised of the charges.
Id.; see also Gen. Tel. Co. ofSw., 457 U.S. at 161 (stressing need for analysis protect society from
overbroad class certifications). The Supreme Court, citing Johnson had the same concerns in mind
regarding overly broad and underexplained class actions. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw., 457 U.S. at 161.
The Court then goes on to state that a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only
be certified if the trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis that the commonality requirement
has been met. Id. at 161.
12 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
13 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356 (2011) (finding decentralized form
of management and limited anecdotal evidence insufficient for certification).
14 See id. at 350 (stating injury "must be of such a nature that it is capable of class wide
resolution.").
15 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 956 (4th Cir. 2015)) (finding percentage ofblacks
who sought promotions was evidence of class discrimination).
16 Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 354-60 (finding need for statistical and
anecdotal evidence to meet Rule 23(a)) with Brown, 576 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2009) (requiring
parties seeking class certification affirmatively demonstrate compliance with Rule 23(a)).
17 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 956-57 (focusing on racial discrimination in steel mill company).
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Americans employees working in a steel mill in South Carolina.' When the
case was originally brought in 2007, the plaintiffs were denied a 23(a)(2)
class certification.1 9 The court did not believe that a certification of the class
was proper due to the lack of statistical evidence that Nucor, the steel plant,
was operating under a company-wide policy of discrimination.20
The plaintiffs appealed the case to the United States Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals on the grounds of an improper class certification, in which
the court was swayed by the evidence presented, distinguishing that a court
is not responsible to find definitive proof of discrimination, but rather that
the evidence provided lends strongly to the possibility.2 1 In addition, the
Appeals Court was not swayed by Nucor's defense that it had a decentralized
management system, finding it possible that Nucor could have had companywide discrimination policies that were enforceable.22 The case was
subsequently remanded to the district court and the court once again refused
to certify the class due to a lack of evidence that there was such a companywide policy of discrimination.23
In 2015, the Fourth Circuit Appeals Court again remanded the case
to the district court ordering that it certify the plaintiffs' class. 24 This paper
will examine the ongoing argument between the District Court of South
Carolina and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 25 In addition, this paper
will draw attention to case law concerning class certification for
discrimination lawsuits in order to make sense of why these two levels of the
justice system differ as to the proper class certification of the Nucor steel
workers.26
See id. at 898 (highlighting ideal claims for racial discrimination law suits).
19 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., No. 2:04-22005-CWH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57522 at *28-29
(D.S.C., Aug. 7, 2007) (detailing cases origination in district court).
20 See id. (noting plaintiffs failed to satisfy "commonality and typicality requirements" of class
claims).
21 See Brown, 576 F.3d at 152 (quoting Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 33633) ("Certification is only concerned with the commonality (not the apparent merit) of the claims
and the existence of a sufficiently numerous group of persons who may assert those claims.").
22 See id. at 158 (showing small businesses have burden to ensure proper workplace practices).
23 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., No. 2:04-22005-CWH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190946, at *8182 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2012) ("[T]he defendants have not identified any issues this Court has
previously treated as common, but which should no longer be considered common.").
24 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 922 (4th Cir. 2015) (showing court's desire to
correct previous decision of trial court).
25 See Brown, 2012 LEXIS 190946, at *13-82 (highlighting trial court's difference in opinion
compared to appeals court).
26 See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (noting claims for
individualized relief do not satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 160 (1982) (noting distinction between ability to include racial discrimination in complaints
and ability to maintain action); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)
(requiring removal of arbitrary barriers to employment that operate to affect racial discrimination);
18
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III. HISTORY
Groups of employees bringing class actions regarding workplace
discrimination, which violate the 1 4 th Amendment and are engrained in work
place policy, are equally deserving of the chance to bring their claims as
27
Lawsuits
groups who seek class action suits regarding other reasons.
alleging racial discrimination in the workplace can be, by their very nature,
28
However, where
an appropriate example of a class action lawsuit.
or a small
an
individual
to
relative
only
is
the
workplace
in
discrimination
lost
recuperate
to
group of people, a class action may be inappropriate
29
rights. Proof of a discriminatory motive has always been considered as a
30
If statistics are
necessary element, and is often proven through statistics.
acts of overt
then
procedures,
and
practices
discriminatory
to
prove
available
for a class
need
the
discrimination do not require specific evidence to prove
31
certification under Rule 23(b).
Class action lawsuits were designed to be an exception to the
common rule that litigation may only be conducted by the parties named in

Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that plaintiff must suffer same
injury as rest of class); see Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 150 (4th Cir. 2009) (appealing
incorrect decision of trial court); United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir.
1980) (noting "proof of a discriminatory motive is a necessary element of a disparate treatment
case"); Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975) (concluding statistical data
implying discrimination sufficient to establish prima facie case of discrimination); Brown v. Nucor
Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190946, at *13-82 (S.C. 2012) (reviewing denial of class
certification); Brown v. Nucor Corp., No. 2:04-22005-CWH, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 57522, at *7-8 (D
S.C. Aug. 7,2007) (outlining standard for determining class).
27 See Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1953) (finding African-Americans
bringing class discrimination suit acceptable under U.S. law).
28 See Sabala v. W. Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142, 1152 (finding racially neutral seniority
system can be basis for class action claim).
29 See Hoston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650,653 (E.D. La. 1975) (finding that ifplaintiff
cannot show proof of discrimination, action should be denied).
30 See United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding statistical
evidence probative of commonality).
31 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (attempting to set test to
determine racial discrimination in workplace).
[Racial discrimination is proven] by showing (i) that [complainant] belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id.; see also Barnett, 518 F.2d at 549 ("Statistics can in appropriate cases establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, without the necessity of showing specific instances of overt
discrimination.").
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the case.32 The courts have repeatedly held that in order to be part of a class
action, an individual must suffer the same injury as the other proposed class
members.33 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") the ability to sue in its
own name for individuals that have been discriminated against, however the
cases in this paper seek to bring discriminatory class actions with their own
name, and not that of the EEOC.3 4 "An individual litigant seeking to
maintain a class action under Title VII must meet 'the prerequisites of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representations
specified in Rule 23(a)."3 5
In 1980, Fairfax County, Virginia was sued by the United States
alleging that the county violated Title VII by pursuing a pattern of racially
motivated hiring procedures biased against African Americans and women.36
Though the district court found that there was no proof of a common injury,
the Supreme Court found that the district court should have granted
injunctive relief against all future discriminatory hiring procedures.37
In 2011, the Supreme Court wrote an opinion on one of the most
expansive class actions ever brought in court against the nation's largest
private employer.38
The plaintiffs alleged that the company was
discriminating against women by denying promotions and pay raises due to

32 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (detailing that class relief
is appropriate when dealing with commonality).
" See id (expounding on necessity of common means of injury); East Tex. Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (finding plaintiffs lacked common injury necessary to
file class action lawsuit); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
216 (1974) (finding that suing to avoid American Compulsory Draft is not certifiable class injury).
34 See Gen. Tel. Co. ofthe Sw., 457 U.S. at 156 (stating individuals may bring their own class
action without EEOC).
35 See id. (noting requirements limit class claims to those encompassed by plaintiffs' claim).
36 See United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 942 (1980) (providing injunctive relief
should be granted where evidence shows discrimination against women and African-Americans).
37 See id. (finding injunctive order should have been granted in case at hand). The Supreme
Court was swayed by the amount of evidence put forth by the United States which included
applicant flow data that measured the available labor market of Fairfax and the surrounding area.
Id. at 938. The government presented statistical evidence that showed wide disparities between the
low number of African Americans and women in Fairfax County's work force and the high number
of African Americans and women in Fairfax County's labor market. Id. at 939. Presentation of
statistical figures tends to sway a court in favor of those seeking class certification. Id.
38 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011) (describing suit brought
against Wal-Mart by over one million current and former female employees). Further, the plaintiffs
were required to affirmatively prove that gender discrimination took place. Id; see also Tex. Dep't
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 250 (1981). "The burden of establishing a prima facie
case of disparate treatment is not onerous. Id. The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Id.
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their biological sex.3 9 The Supreme Court explained that crux of the issue in
determining whether certification of a class was proper was the commonality
requirement of Federal Rule 23(a)(2).4 0 The Court elaborated that
commonality is not a question of whether the plaintiffs have all suffered from
behavior that violates Title VII, but whether they have suffered from the
same vehicle of harm.41
The Supreme Court stated that, "conceptually, there is a wide gap
between: (a) an individual's claim that he has been denied a promotion. .
on discriminatory ground, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the
company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of
42
persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual."
The Court offered two ways to bridge the conceptual gap between
these propositions.4 3 The plaintiffs were unable to prove that there was a
biased testing procedure that prevented pay raises and promotion nor that
Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination.' Plaintiffs bear
a high burden of proof on a claim of a general policy of discrimination due
45
to the wide nature of the claim.

The plaintiffs' only expert witness testified that he was unable to
calculate whether 0.5 percent of promotions were gender biased, or if 95
percent of promotions were racially biased.46 The Court concluded that the
39 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (detailing Civil Rights
Act); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 343 (alleging that these denials of promotion and
pay violated Civil Rights Act of 1964).
40 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)) ("The crux of
this case is commonality - the rule requiring a plaintiff to show 'there are questions of law or fact
common to the class."').
41 See id. (describing nuance of requirement of commonality). The plaintiffs' claim of Title
VII discrimination is not a commonality argument because there is a difference between broad
discrimination under a provision of law and a singular type of discrimination that is being
systematically repeated against a large class of people. Id.
42 See id. at 352-53 (examining conceptual gap between discrimination and commonality).
43 See id. at 353 (detailing suggested ways of bridging conceptual gap). First, the Court
provided that if an employer were to use a testing procedure to evaluate an applicant that had a
discrimination basis, then a class action brought by those affected by that procedure would satisfy
the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). Id. Second, if significant proof were
offered as evidence that the employer operated under a policy of discrimination that could justify a
class action brought by those generally discriminated against. Id.
4 See id. at 353 (noting plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence).
45 See id at 3 54-55 (describing insufficiency of evidence introduced by plaintiffs of general
policy of discrimination). The plaintiffs' only evidence of a discrimination policy was the testimony
of a sociological expert who testified that Wal-Mart had a strong corporate culture making it
vulnerable to gender bias. Id.
46 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 354 (finding standards for admission of expert
testimony not applicable at certification stage of class-action proceeding). The Court expressed
doubt that the expert testimony had enough weight to prove whether the class was properly
certified. Id.
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only matter the plaintiffs' evidence established convincingly was that WalMart's decentralized management procedures allowed for local supervisor
discretion on employment matters.4 7 Commonality is a fundamental and
critical piece to a successful class action under Federal Rule 23, and the
plaintiffs' inability in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, to present statistical
evidence of a company-wide policy prevented them from proper class
certification.48
Justice Scalia stated in the majority opinion of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes that there are two ways to bridge the conceptual gap between an
individual's claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory
grounds and the existence of a class of persons that has suffered the same
injury. 49 First, an aggrieved party would have to demonstrate that the
employer used a biased testing procedure to evaluate applicants for
employment, and only then would the party be able to bring a class action on
behalf of all the applicants who might have been prejudiced by the biased
test."o The other option that Justice Scalia references provides that
significant proof must be offered to show an employer operated under a
general policy of discrimination.' Neither option employed by the plaintiffs
to bridge the gap between claims of discrimination in the workplace and the
existence of a class of persons that suffered injuries that share common
questions of law or fact.52 The Supreme Court further discussed Wal-Mart's
allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters which, in

47 See id at 355 (holding plaintiffs failed to prove commonality). "On its face, of course, that
is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed
for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices." Id.
48 See id. at 357 (finding regional, decentralized supervision in companies did not lend well to
company-wide discrimination claims).
49 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 353 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147 (1982)) (reiterating ways to bridge gap between injury and commonality).
5o See id at 353 (detailing one way to bridge conceptual gap).
5' See id. (finding significant burden of proof difficult to satisfy). The discrimination must
manifest in the hiring or promotion practices in the same general fashion and be brought about
through an entirely subjective decision-making process by supervisors and employees. Id.
52 See id (finding plaintiffs unable to bridge conceptual gap). The plaintiffs were unable to
bridge the gap via the first option because Wal-Mart was not shown to haves testing procedure or
any other company-wide evaluation methods that could be accused of having a bias built into its
procedures. Id. In so concluding, Justice Scalia reasons that the whole point of permitting
discretionary decision-making is to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard. Id. The
plaintiffs also failed to bridge the gap via the second option discussed when they failed to offer
significant proof of discrimination. Id. The only evidence of discrimination that was offered was
a sociologist that testified who Wal-Mart had a strong corporate culture that made it vulnerable to
gender bias. Id.
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certain cases, can give rise to a Title VII liability under a disparate impact
theory but was not a valid claim in the case at hand.53
In 2006, six African American employees brought a class action
lawsuit against Nucor-Yamato Steel Company in Arkansas alleging racial
discrimination practices and procedures.5 4 The district court denied the
motion for class certification because the plaintiffs' claims did not meet the
commonality requirement of Federal Rule 23(a)(2).ss A simple assertion that
racial imbalance and discrimination exist within a workplace is not enough
to establish a Title VII, Rule 23 class action.5 6 The district court must use
rigorous analysis to determine whether enough statistical evidence is
presented to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), and if appealed, the
appeals court must determine if the class certification question is a clear
57
error, not whether a reasonable court could decide in either party's favor.
The plaintiffs were unable to prevail with their class certification due to the

53 See id. at 355 (focusing on gender discrimination in the workplace); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trt., 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (finding disparate impact analysis applicable under Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964). A corporate policy permitting discretion by supervisors is a
uniform employment practice that typically dispels suspicion that a company has a uniform
employment practice that contains bias. Id. While giving discretion to low-level supervisions
should raise no inference of discriminatory conduct in most cases, the Supreme Court has
recognized cases in which the practice can be the basis of a disparate impact theory. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 355. While this seems counterintuitive, an employer's undisciplined
system of subjective decision making can have the same effect as a system that is tainted with
intentional discrimination. Watson, 487 U.S. at 491. However, this theory of liability must remain
the exception and not the rule when it comes to examining policies that allow for discretion because
presuming discrimination where discretion is involved would be too harsh of a burden for
employers to bear. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 355.
54 See Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 2011) ("The plaintiffs asserted both
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of liability.").
5 See id. at 809 (finding evidence presented was not sufficient to prove company-wide
discrimination).
56 See id at 818 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i)) ("The plaintiffs must show that the
employer uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact").
57 See Bennett, 656 F.3d at 814 (finding rigorous analysis necessary to determine claim).
The parties created an extensive record on class certification that included more than a
thousand pages of expert reports, business records, sworn declarations, deposition
transcripts, answers to interrogatories, and other evidentiary exhibits and materials. We
cannot say that the district court, faced with this sizable and sometimes-contradictory
record, clearly erred in finding that employment practices varied substantially across the
plant's various production departments.
Id. at 814. In addition, the plaintiffs offered expert testimony that included inaccurate statements
regarding Nucor's hiring procedures, which led the court to discredit a large portion of the
plaintiffs' argument. Id. at 816.
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lack of statistical evidence proving that Nucor had a general policy of
discrimination."
In 2007, a group of African American steel plant workers brought a
class action lawsuit against their employer alleging discriminatory practices
and procedures." The plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal
Rule 23(a) to represent all African American employees at Nucor Berkeley
Manufacturing Plant in Huger, South Carolina, based on patterns of disparate
treatment against African-American employees, promotion procedures
which had a negative impact on African American employees, and a hostile
work environment at the plant.60 As evidence, the plaintiffs presented five
statistical comparisons to prove the difference in promotion rates between
African-American and White workers." The court concluded that though
the plaintiffs' presentation of evidence met the numerosity requirement of a
Federal Rule 23 class action, it failed to show that the class raised a single
question of law or fact that was common to all proposed members of the
class.62 Like the District Court in Bennett, the district court in Brown
decertified the class because the plaintiffs were unable to present sufficient
statistical evidence of a general workplace-wide policy of discrimination.63
The plaintiffs in Brown appealed the case to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which vacated the decision and remanded
the case back to the district court with instructions.' The appeals court
reaffirmed the maxim of discrimination cases stating that, "a Title VH class
action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have

'8 See id. at 820 ("The plaintiffs do not identify evidence that specifically contradicts Nucor's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the failure to promote . . . .").
' See Brown v. Nucor Corp., No. 2:04-22005, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57522, at *18-20 (D.
S. C. Aug. 7, 2007) (finding non-centralized management system could not lead to discriminatory
practices).
60 See id at 8 (discussing basis for plaintiffs' claims against employer). A court is more likely
to certify a class when the plaintiffs can present statistical evidence supported by anecdotal
evidence of discrimination. Id. at 9. The plaintiffs used the percentage of African-Americans living
in homes near the Nucor plant as an example of the labor pool to show that white employees were
more likely to be promoted. Id at 10. In addition, the plaintiffs compared the percentage of AfricanAmericans who applied for promotions between 1999 and 2003 and the percentage of those who
received promotions. Id. at 11-12. The study showed that while 19.24% of employees applying for
jobs at the plant were African-American, only 7.94% of those applicants were promoted. Id at 13.
61 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing strength of
statistical evidence offered by plaintiffs).
62 See Brown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57522 at *18 (determining plaintiffs were unable to meet
commonality requirement).
63 See id. at *25 ("Because the class does not have a common claim and the plaintiffs' claims
are not typical of the class claims, the plaintiffs are not adequate representatives of the class.").
6 See Brown, 576 F.3d at 150 (finding lower court decision incorrect).
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been satisfied."" The appeals court overruled the decision of the district
court regarding the commonality of the plaintiffs."6 The appeals court stated
that it was not the job of the district court to definitively determine the
appellants had been discriminated against, rather, it was to determine
whether the basis of the claims were sufficient to warrant class
certification.6" In addition, the court ruled that while a decentralized form of
management bolsters an argument against a company-wide policy of
discrimination, the separate departments at Nucor were not as autonomous
as they held themselves out to be. 68 Ultimately the appeals court remanded
the case to the district court.69
By 2012, the district court filed a decision that once again refused to
certify the class, claiming that the plaintiffs were unable to establish a
common injury.7 1 While the plaintiffs could show compelling evidence that
African-Americans were being discriminated against in the beam mill, the
evidence presented did not account for the behavior that took place in the
other departments at Nucor. 7 1 The threshold of what constitutes convincing
statistical evidence of discrimination and of what is considered an
65 See id. at 152 (reviewing court's prior decision in case for abuse of discretion in analysis).
66 See id. at 153 (finding appellants had sufficiently presented direct evidence of
discrimination). The court was persuaded by the evidence presented, including the denial of
promotions of African Americans when less experienced white employees were promoted, the
denial of training specialization for African Americans, and statements from white supervisors
expressing their unwillingness to promote African Americans. Id.
67 See id. at 156 (requiring diligence when analyzing strength of statistical evidence). Though,
the appeals court discussed the rigorous analysis a district court must go through to determine if a
class has commonality, the court clarified this concept by providing that it is not the court's job to
determine concretely that the plaintiffs were discriminated against. Id.
68 See Brown, 576 F.3d at 157 (finding defendant did not possess decentralized form of
management). Testimony from the manager of the Nucor beam mill provide that the beam mill
was separate from the other departments, however, this testimony directly conflicted with
testimony from the manager of the melt shop that the beam mill was attached to the hot mill and
melt shop. Id. Further the fact that all employees shared locker rooms, combined with all the other
evidence, showed that Nucor-Berkeley did not possess a decentralized form of management at the
time of the lawsuit. Id. at 158.
69 See id. at 160 (discussing reasons for remanding case).
70 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190946, at *2 (D. S.C. 2012) (assessing
strength of statistical evidence). The court wanted to ensure the public was aware that it was not
discounting the gravity of the plaintiffs' allegations, but that without the ability to prove that
discrimination happened in all the departments of Nucor, to establish that there was no
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). Id. The court did not doubt that African-American employees
were being discriminated against and harassed in the beam mill department of Nucor. Id. "In
addition to comprising a majority of the plaintiffs' declarations, testimony from Beam Mill
employees accounts for almost all of the allegations of overtly racist behavior on the part of
manager or supervisors." Id. at *46-47. Further, beam mill managers allegedly stated, "I don't
think we'll ever have a black supervisor while I'm here." Id. at *47.
71 See id. at *42 (finding evidence of discrimination in one department not dispositive in
proving discrimination in other departments).
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overarching policy of discrimination are determinations that the federal
judiciary has consistently been grappling with in the context of Rule 23 class
action lawsuits.72 The present state of the decision in the legal battle between
Brown and Nucor rests with the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 2015."
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Comparisonsbetween DistrictandAppeals Court
Typically, an appeals court will only review a district court's
certification order for abuse of discretion.74 However in Brown, the Fourth
Circuit of the Court of Appeals decided to examine the case de novo because
the district court's decertification order violated the mandate set by the
Fourth Circuit of Appeals in 2009.11 In that 2009 decision, the court
determined that the Nucor plant should have been treated as a single entity,
meeting the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), however the district court in 2012
revisited this decision that was not within the purview of the court to
reexamine.76 A district court abuses its discretion when it materially
misapplies the requirements of Rule 33 and the critical question in front of

72 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 339 (2011) (noting claims for
individualized relief do not satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 155-56 (1982) (noting distinction between ability to include racial discrimination in
complaints and ability to maintain action); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801
(1973) (requiring removal of arbitrary barriers to employment which operate to effect racial
discrimination); Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 2011) (expounding on need
for commonality); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 150 (4th Cir. 2009) (focusing on how to
meet commonality standard); United States v. Cty. of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1980)
(noting "proof of a discriminatory motive is a necessary element of a disparate treatment case");
Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975) (concluding statistical data implying
discrimination sufficient to establish prima facie case of discrimination); Brown v. Nucor Corp.,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190946 at *82 (S.C. 2012) (refusing to certify class after case was remanded
by appeals court); Brown v. Nucor Corp., No. 2:04-22005, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57522 at *2829 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2007) (refusing class certification).
7 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 919 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding class certification
was proper).
74 See id. at 901 (discussing standard of review applied to case at hand).
7 See id. (concluding district court's decision to reconsider class certification did not violate
Brown I); see also Brown, 576 F.3d at 150 (finding plaintiffs class certification was proper).
76 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 901-902 ("[The court finds] that the district court's decision to
reconsider the certification of the workers' class did not itself violate our mandate in Brown I ....
Because the district court could reexamine whether the workers met the requirement of
commonality, we review those findings under the abuse of discretion standard. . . .").
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the appeals court in this case was whether the district court materially
misapplied Rule 23(a)(2)."
B. Alternative StatisticalData Benchmark
In Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the court determined that the class
in question required decertification due to the Supreme Court's interpretation
of that Rule 23(a)(2) that emphasized analytical rigor in evaluating statistical
evidence of commonality and the relationship between a common injury and
how a company policy made that injury possible and the appeals court took
a careful approach to answer each of these arguments.78 With regard to the
standard of review, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. reaffirmed that courts must
examine whether Rule 23(a) has been met by the class at the certification
stage. 79 The standard for examining a class is a rigorous one but it does not
give courts free reign to consider the merits of the claims themselves.o The
merits of a case and the strength of the plaintiffs argument are considered
through Rule 23(a) and is often misapplied because determining whether
there is a commonality among the potential class can often be construed as
evaluating the strengths of a claim." The appeals court was quick to note in
its opinion that in actuality, Rule 23 is far from a mere pleading standard.8 2
The Plaintiffs' statistical evidence passed muster under the WalMart standard of review for commonality of injury related to a class.83 The

" See Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir. 2006) ("A district
court per se abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law or clearly errs in its factual
findings.").
78 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011) (finding class certification
was not proper due to lack of statistical evidence).
79 See id. at 340 (expounding on need for rigorous examination of merits of class). A rigorous
examination of whether a class has met the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) will overlap with
examination of the merits of the claim itself as the issues are often intertwined. Id.; see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a) (providing requirements of a class that may be represented in court). A class that
has common questions of law or fact with similar legal defenses is a proper class. Id.
80 See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 464-65 (2013) (noting
Rule 23 does not permit wide-ranging merit inquiries at certification stage). The court is only

allowed to consider the merits of a claim when it is relevant in determining the proper certification
or denial of certification of a class regarding federal Rule 23(a). Id. at 464.
81 See Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (statin evaluation of
merits is not a part of Rule 23(a) class certification).
82 See Brown v. Nucor Corp, 785 F.3d 895, 903 (4th Cir. 2015) ("It is true that Brown I
cautioned 'an in-depth assessment of the merits of appellants' claims at [the certification] stage
would be improper."'); Amgen Inc., 568 U.S. at 464 (refusing to allow free range merit inquires at
the certification stage). The Supreme Court has dictated that a court may engage in the merits of a
claim only to the extent that it verifies that Rule 23(a) has been made. Id.
83 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 904-05 (finding alternative data is proper if available). As the court
recognized:
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appeals court made the distinction that although the Plaintiffs supplied
secondary data, which was a less precise measure of hiring information,
plaintiffs may rely on alternative reliable data when a company has destroyed
primary evidence related to discrimination cases. 84
The question of whether or not alternative data is perfect is not the
standard for the court to ask of plaintiffs, the standard is whether the
alternative data is reliable and probative of discrimination in the workplace
and whether or not assumptions made from the data are reasonable and
The appeals court highlighted two incorrect
probative of discrimination.
assumptions that the district court made regarding the data that was provided
by the steel plant workers.86 First, the district court questioned information
on job forms and whether they presented the conclusion that the plaintiffs
assumed.8 ' However, the appeals court stated this assumption was not relied
upon by Plaintiffs' experts in meeting the standard for alternative evidence
produced and therefore would not be a proper reason to decertify the class."
C. The Necessity of StatisticalAssumptions
The appeals court criticized the district court for incorrectly
analyzing the potential make up of bidding pools for the twenty seven

-

The parties' central dispute concerns the data used to analyze the period from December
1999 to January 2001, when Nucor failed to retain actual bidding records. For that
period, the workers' expert developed an alternative benchmark that uses 27 relevant
'change-of-status' forms - filled out when an employee changes positions at the plant
to extrapolate promotions data ....
Id. at 903-04.
8 See id. at 904 (finding destroyed evidence allows plaintiff to use proxy data); Lewis v.
Bloomsbury Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 568 (4th Cir. 1985) (describing ability to use proxy data
when actual data is unreliable or unavailable). In Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, the Plaintiffs were
allowed to use United States Census data to show an available pool of black female applicants after
the company disposed of potential employment applications for the period in which the suit was
brought. Id at 568. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has allowed plaintiffs to
extrapolate data from prior employment applications that had not been destroyed. See United States
v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980).
85 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 904 (allowing court to make reasonable assumptions where data is
missing). To determine whether the data provided is reliable, a court may take liberties if statistical
assumptions made in the data are reasonable. Id. at 904.
" See id. (identifying that district court targeted two assumptions by plaintiffs as problematic).
87 See id. at 904-905 (acknowledging the promotions represented within the forms). "The
district court first questioned the assumption that the job changes described on the 27 forms
represent promotions. As an example of clear factual error committed by the court it quoted ...
from the dissent in Brown I to argue that the forms may represent job changes unrelated to
promotions." Id. (citation omitted).
88 See id. at 905 (finding decertification would not be proper by trial court).
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available positions at the steel plant. 89 The district court believed that while
the assumptions made regarding the bidding pool may have been relevant to
prove discrimination, the necessity of making the assumptions undermined
and diminished the probative value of the evidence of discrimination and
found that the class had to be decertified." As the appeals court previously
concluded a reduction in probative value, which is a characteristic of the
second hand nature of proxy data, does not cause statistical data to be
immediately unreliable and, therefore, is not a bar to proving a commonality
to a class action discrimination law suit with regards to Rule 23(a)(2)."

The assumptions the plaintiffs explicitly argued were viewed
positively by the appeals court, in relation to the views of the district court,
however the District Court went further in examining more statistical
assumptions in the discrimination evidence that were not argued by either
Plaintiffs or Defendants specifically.92 The Defendants did not possess
records nor identified in the trial court record that the African American
worker were not qualified for potential promotions and yet the District Court
questioned the reliability of the statistical evidence by pondering that very
assumption.9 3 The unspoken assumption made by the Plaintiffs that a
majority of applicants would be qualified for the promotion, with the
understanding that only a few would be grossly unqualified, is not enough to
reduce the probative value of the commonality claim of the plaintiffs that the
trial court was so dubious of in the previous trial.94 Critics of the majority
89 See id. (detailing example of unreasonable statistical assumption).
Due to discovery
limitations put in place by the district court, information regarding promotions like statistical
assumptions cannot be acquired through proper discovery means. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs had
to assume that there was at least one African American person applying for each position, which
the district court found to be an unreasonable assumption. Id. at 906.
90 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 906 (finding that too many assumptions can degrade probative value
of statistical evidence). The appeals court concluded that proxy data is too greatly reduced in
probative value to prove statistics-based discrimination in the workplace, where a company has
destroyed original evidence contradicting what has been set forth in previous cases. Id.; United
States v. City of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980) (allowing applicant data based partially
on assumptions).
91 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 906 (finding secondhand data has probative value in assessing
commonality). A court cannot simply bar statistical discrimination evidence from a trial because
it is secondhand and is not the original data compiled by the defendant-company. Id.
92 See id. ("Specifically, the dissent suggests that the black workers may not have been
qualified for higher paying jobs and that they may have been denied promotions because of
disciplinary records that were not themselves the result of racial animus.").
93 See id. (assuming potential applicants met minimum job requirements). The Nucor job
listing mentions only the minimum job qualifications that were required to be considered for the
job. Id. Further, the appeals court suggests that it is reasonable to assume that the applicants that
applied for the postings would, a large majority of the time, possess the minimum requirements for
the job, otherwise they would not apply. Id.
94 See id. (discussing disciplinary records of potential applicants). In addition to suggesting
the African American workers were unqualified for the promotions, the dissent suggested that it
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opinion argue that alternative statistical information is not as probative as it
needs to be and therefore the assumptions that are drawn from that data are
more unreliable and further undermine its probative value leading critics to
want to exclude the evidence altogether, however the majority opinion, due
to the reasons laid out previously, do not ascribe to this philosophy and use
the alternative information more readily."
D. The StatisticalRequirement ofProof
Having decided the question of whether alternative statistical
evidence should be allowed to prove commonality per Rule 23(a), the
appeals court shifted its focus to determining whether or not the statistical
proof was enough to certify the class.96 The Supreme Court previously
decided the benchmark for determining what constitutes statistical evidence
The appeals court determined the
in favor of proving discrimination.
statistical disparity exceeded the benchmark of proof, and that the district
court abused its discretion in decertifying the class.9 8 The District Court,
after incorrectly analyzing the statistical evidence, per the Appeals Court,
incorrectly analyzed the anecdotal evidence of discrimination provided by
the Plaintiffs." The strategy the Plaintiffs presented for anecdotal evidence

was the disciplinary records of those workers that prevented them from gaining promotions. Id.
The majority opinion did not subscribe to that line of reasoning. Id. at 907. As worker Ramon
Roane has stated:
Discipline, attendance, and safety allegations are similar factors that are not equally
applied and that have been used as an excuse to deny promotions to me and other persons
of my race. The attitudes I have experienced with white supervisors lead me to believe
that my race and that of other black employees makes a difference in how we are treated
and viewed for discipline[,] promotions[,] and training.
Id. at 907 (alteration in original).
95 See Brown, 785 F.3d 895 at 912 (finding dissenter's arguments against alternative evidence
were unreasonable).
96 See id. at 908 ("With the alternative benchmark evidence included, the statistical disparity
in promotions is statistically significant at 2.54 standard deviations from what would be expected
if race were a neutral factor.").
9 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (indicating any
come in infinite
standard deviation of two or greater would be suspicious). "[S]tatistics ...
variety ... [Their] usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." Id. at
312 (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977)).
98 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 908 ("Here, the surrounding circumstances and anecdotal evidence
of discrimination, . . . are precisely what help animate the statistical findings [of discrimination].").
9 See id. at 909 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)) (deciding
anecdotal evidence was incorrectly analyzed). The rule set down for the commonality requirement
instructs that a plaintiff must present a common contention that can be proven, and thus class-wide
proceedings must be able to generate common answers regarding the litigation. Id.

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIII

104

of discrimination rested upon a disparate treatment theory, which coupled
with the statistical evidence of discrimination, typically satisfies the standard
of proof.100
Although Brown, mentions the Wal-Mart standard of class
certification for discrimination lawsuits, there are three significant
differences between the two cases that make the District Court's strict
adherence to Wal-Martproblematic.' 01 The first problematic difference lays
in the strength of the statistical evidence provided in both cases.102 The
Plaintiffs in Wal-Mart were unable to prove that an employee in one state
was subject to the same type of discrimination as an employee in another
state.1 0 3 In the case at hand, the Nucor plant workers numbering only one
hundred people all worked in a single steel mill in South Carolina.1 04 The
differences in size and scope of Wal-Mart and the Nucor Steel plant standout
and the district court was incorrect to conflate the two cases as being
identical.

10

The second difference between the two cases is that the theory of
commonality in the Wal-Mart case relied on showing that Wal-Mart
maintained a culture in which discrimination was fused into the hiring
process.1 0 6 The Nucor steel plant plaintiffs had provided evidence seemingly

"o See Brown, 785 F.3d 895 at 908 (finding little value in limited anecdotal evidence when
dealing with national corporation). "In the absence of a common job evaluation procedure, WalMart held that statistical proof of employment discrimination at the regional and national level,
coupled with limited anecdotal evidence from some states, was insufficient to show that the
company maintained a 'general policy of discrimination' .....
Id at 909. With this standard in
mind, the plaintiffs in the current case presented an argument with heavy statistical and anecdotal
evidence to better meet the standard. Id. at 908.
101 See id. at 909 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. 338 (2011)) (showing significant
differences in levels of statistical and anecdotal evidence provided).
102 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 909 ("Wal-Mart discounted the plaintiffs' statistical evidence in
large part because the statistics failed to show discrimination on a store-by-store basis.").
103 See id. at 909 (considering scope and size of class as roadblock to commonality).
In
addition to the inability to prove that discrimination affected employees company-wide, the WalMart case had approximately 1.5 million people in it is class action working at over 3,000 stores
nationwide. Id. The sheer scope of the class itself served as roadblock to properly certifying the
class. Id
104 See id at 910 ("The class members shared common spaces, were in regular physical contact
with other departments, could apply for promotions in other departments, and were subject to
hostile plant-wide policies and practices.").
1os See id. (finding strong value in anecdotal evidence provided by plaintiffs). The trial court
held that the plaintiffs had submitted proof that the landscape of the steel plant was hostile towards
African-Americans and that the defendants failed to act to end the harassment, which was very
strong evidence pointing to a systemic tolerance of racial hostility by managers and supervisors.
Id. at 157.
106 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 334 (2011) (showing expert testimony
does not guaranteed class certification will be granted). Although the Supreme Court was not
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without end of racism throughout the plant including racist behavior from
supervisors, which the plaintiffs used to establish a claim for disparate
treatment.o 7 The dissent of the appeals court rejected the idea that a racially
hostile work environment helped establish a claim for disparate treatment in
promotion decisions, a notion that the majority opinion was completely
opposed to.'0o The assertion, that the evidence in the record did not support
a connection between racial discrimination and discrimination in hiring and
promotion practices, is groundless and the majority opinion made it clear
that it was not limited to what is contained in the record to make elementary
judgments such as the connection between discrimination and hiring
practices. 109
The third distinction between Wal-Mart and Nucor stems from the
sheer amount of evidence that was offered by the Nucor steel workers, which
was much more in depth and more probative than the evidence that was
offered by the Wal-Mart employees." 0 The Supreme Court has set precedent
that a class certification for commonality with anecdotes of evidence must
typically come from roughly one of out every eight people contained in the
class."' In the Wal-Mart case, the plaintiffs offered affidavits from about
120 employees describing discrimination, meaning only one affidavit of
discrimination for every 12,500 class members which is very far below the
standard of one to eight established by the Supreme Court forty years

swayed, the Plaintiff had an expert witness testify that Wal-Mart's hiring process was vulnerable
to gender bias. Id.
107 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 912 ("The examples in the record are ubiquitous: bigoted epithets
and monkey noises broadcast across the plant radio system, emails with highly offensive images
sent to black workers, a hangman's noose prominently displayed, . . . and abundant racist graffiti
in locker rooms and shared spaces."). In addition to vulgar displays of racism, Nucor had only one
black supervisor until the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought charges against
them. Id.
108 See id. ("It is difficult to fathom how widespread racial animus of the type alleged here, an
animus that consistently emphasized the inferiority of black workers, bears no relationship to
decisions whether or not to promote an employee of that race.").
09 See id. ("Justice is not blind to history, and we need not avert out eyes from the broader
circumstances surrounding employment decisions, and the inferences that naturally follow.").
110 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 564 U.S. at 353-56 (describing probative value of evidence
offered by plaintiffs); see also Brown, 785 F.3d at 932-33 (showing probative value of evidence
offered by plaintiffs).
.. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977) (setting precedent
of ratios of anecdote provided by class members). The plaintiffs in the Teamsters case produced
roughly forty accounts of discrimination from members of the potential class. Id. Due to the class
of plaintiffs that contained 334 people, there was roughly one anecdote for every eight people in
the class. Id. The Court certified the class as having enough anecdotal evidence of discrimination.
Id. Therefore, Teamsters is used as a benchmark when determining the appropriate amount of
anecdotal evidence to certify a class. Id.
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prior.' 12 in the case at hand, the Nucor steel workers provided anecdotal
evidence from approximately sixteen individuals from a class that included
roughly 100 past and present employees of the steel plant when the litigation
commenced, giving the plaintiffs a ratio of I anecdote for every 6.25
members of the class.1 13 The appeals court noted that while this does not
meet the standard, that many of the Nucor workers took a risk in giving these
statements accusing their employer of workplace discrimination if the
114
litigation were to be unsuccessful, these workers could lose their jobs.
E. Evidentiary diferences between Wal-Mart andNucor
There are significant differences in both the amount of statistical and
anecdotal evidence presented by Nucor and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., which
when combined, proves there is a higher standard of commonality demanded
by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.."' The question of why the
female employees at Wal-Mart were potentially discriminated against poses
many answers, but the evidence presented by the employees at the Nucor
steel plant leaves only one: the discrimination stems from the race of the
employees.11 6 The purpose of Title VII is to achieve equal employment
opportunities and remove race barriers that stand in the way of equal
opportunity. 17 Although Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. set a high standard for the
commonality requirement in Rule 23, when a plaintiff has produced
substantial evidence of engrained discrimination of or as an employment
practice to deny commonality by wrongfully comparing it to the Wal-Mart
8
Stores, Inc. standard weakens Title VII's bulwark against discrimination."

112 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 358 (discussing ratios of anecdotes of discrimination
offered by plaintiffs). The affidavits provided only came from 235 of Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores. Id
In addition, there were no affidavits of discrimination provided from workers in fourteen different
states at all. Id.
113 See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2009) (going into detail about size
of potential class).
114 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 914 (highlighting although plaintiffs did not meet ratio that they
were not disqualified). Nucor intended to use the affidavits provided for every purpose under the
Federal Rules of Evidence including attempts to decertify the class and impeachment the witnesses.
Id
115 See id. ("Such a claim requires proof of a 'system wide pattern or practice' of discrimination
such that the discrimination is 'the regular rather than the unusual practice."').
116 See id. at 915 ("Unlike a disparate impact claim, a showing of disparate treatment does not
require the identification of a specific employment policy responsible for the discrimination.").
117 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) ("The objective of Congress in
the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities .... .").
"' See Brown, 785 F.3d at 915 (finding plaintiffs met standards set by Supreme Court for class
certification).
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Providing statistics and anecdotes is crucial to show a disparate
racial impact claim to prove commonality for a desired class action, specific
employment practices that caused the purported disparate racial impact must
also be identified." 9 The Supreme Court recognizes the discretion of lowlevel supervisors can lead to a successful disparate impact claim, however
the larger the class, the more difficult it is to prove a consistent exercise of
discrimination. 120 The Nucor steel plant workers do not represent a
nationwide class, but a class of approximately 100 African American
workers who all work at a single facility. 121 The Supreme Court has raised
the bar for certification of a class under a disparate impact theory through
the Wal-Mart decision, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
provided several ways that a disparate impact claim may satisfy Rule 23 in
the aftermath of Wal-Mart.122 First, an exercise of discretion must be tied to
a specific employment practice that disparately affected a specific class in a
uniform manner. 123 Secondly, the employment practice must be a companywide policy of discrimination in which high-level personnel are taking
liberties to exercise. 124
By applying these standards, for purposes of class certification, the
Nucor steel plant workers provided sufficient evidence of a discriminatory
workplace policy that was exercised by high-level personnel and that

"9 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(i) (noting that specific practices
must be noted). The Civil Rights Act outlines that:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this
title only if - a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.
Id.
120 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356 (2011) (noting more difficulty
certifying nationwide class for discrimination claims).
121 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 916 (highlighting size of class as important factor in class
certification). A policy of discretionary decision-making in a localized class of workers forms a
basis for a disparate impact claim more easily, especially when the policy exhibits pervasive racial
hostility. Id.
122 See Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 114 (4th Cir. 2013) (identifying
methods to satisfy disparate impact claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23).
123 See id. ("[E]ven in cases where the complaint alleges discretion, ifthere is also an allegation
of a company-wide policy of discrimination, the putative class may still satisfy the commonality
requirement for certification.").
124 See id at 115-16 (finding harm must be directly related to policies plaintiff purports
discrimination as a result). The difference between discrimination policies being exercised by lowlevel personnel and high-level personnel is crucial to the claim because lower-level employees
cannot set policies in general whereas high-level personnel have that ability, making it more likely
to prove a disparate impact claim. Id.
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125
The
combined these actions created a racially charged environment.
environment
plant
steel
the
in
evidence of pervasive racial discrimination
needs a common mode of application in order to be a proper claim for a class
action against workplace discrimination. 12 6 The presence of statistics and
anecdotal evidence helps bridge the gap between discrimination and the
uniform mode of application. 127 In Wal-Mart, the court found it unlikely that
managers across the country were exercising a common method of
discrimination in the workplace, while it is much more probable that one
hundred workers in a steel manufacturing plant could be commonly
discriminated against in the present case at hand. 128
While the most recent decision in Brown v. Nucor is relatively new,
there was a 9th U.S. District Court decision that cited to Brown v. Nucor as
persuasive authority to certify a class action through disparate treatment
commonality. 12 9

125 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 917 (finding that burden of proof was met by plaintiffs in case at
hand). The workers provided sufficient statistical evidence that the promotions systems requiring
approval from high-level personnel, created the ability for a department head to racially
discriminate when going through the promotions process. Id at 916. In addition, the appeals court
concluded that the general manager of the Nucor plant should have been on notice about the
pronounced racial differences in his managing class because of evidence presented by the plaintiffs.
Id. There was evidence introduced at trial that Nucor employees had lodged complaints with the
general manager of the plant about workplace discrimination. Id. The general manager responded
by threatening to fire the employees who complained about discrimination. Id. at 917.
126 See Brown, 785 F.3d at 917 (finding plaintiffs' evidence of discrimination is link to mode
of discrimination).
127 See id. (highlighting the high probative value of statistical and anecdotal evidence). The
appeals court was swayed by the evidence that was presented to the Court that shows a link between
the racial animosity of the supervisors and the methods of promotion that were put in place by the
supervisors. Id. In addition, the appeals court points to a deposition of a high-level employee of
the steel plant as an accurate representation of the environment at the steel plant, "I don't think
we'll ever have a black supervisor while I'm here." Id.
128 See id. (explaining easier to certify a smaller class of plaintiffs); Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703
F.3d 1206, 1222 (10th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Court held that the company's practice of leaving hiring
and promotion decisions to the discretion of local supervisors without a more specific policy could
not form the basis for class certification.").
129 See Rollins v. Traylor Bros., No. C14-1414 JCC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7294, at *19-20
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 917 (4th Cir. 2015))
(finding disparate treatment as a rationale for commonality requirement). The Court in Rollins
stated that significant proof of a policy of discrimination can be shown entirely though statistics
and anecdotal evidence that show a pattern of discrimination. Id. at 19-20. Further, the Court goes
on to state that even if the pattern is a result of the company employing a policy that defers
discretionary decisions to employees that can constitute a pattern of discrimination that reaches the
standard of a disparate treatment which would satisfy the commonality requirement for class
certification. Id. at 20.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(2) states that
members of a class may sue on behalf of all members if there are questions
of law or fact common to the class. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
23(b) states that a class action law suit may be brought under Rule 23(a) only
if a commonality of fact or law exists within the class that predominates any
concern that an individual may want to litigate on their own. These class
actions lawsuits exist to benefit classes of wronged people with expediency
and accessibility. Naturally, a 23(a) class action suit is desirable to class
action racial discrimination suits.
However, what may be naturally desirable does not always naturally
translate into the law. The legal debate that has developed through Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, which was furthered by Brown v. Nucor Corp. shows a divided
opinion on class action lawsuits for discrimination in the workplace. WalMart demonstrates a potential way for the Supreme Court to streamline class
action racial discrimination lawsuits. The plaintiff must demonstrate an
employer practice that is enforced by management leading to a specific harm.
The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart, female employees employed across the
nation at Wal-Mart stores, were unable to provide anecdotal evidence that
discrimination took place in a uniform fashion and was carried out
systematically by the management of the company. Thus, a rule was created
by the Supreme Court to limit the ability to bring a discrimination class
action. This is not a new limitation, this is merely a clarification of the
commonality requirement imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a)(2). General discrimination by one group of people to another does not
present a class-wide claim.
The Supreme Court stated that it was looking for a way to bridge the
gap between a party bringing a discrimination claim based on workplace
behaviors and the group of people affected by these behaviors. The Court
suggested that there are two ways to bridge this gap. Either the party must
show that the employer used a biased testing procedure to evaluate
applicants, or the party must show significant proof that the employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination that manifested itself in the
hiring process and promotion practices.
An accurate demonstration of the Wal-Mart rule of bridging the gap
is demonstrated by Brown v. Nucor Corp. The plaintiffs must be able to
present anecdotal and statistical evidence proving that management
systematically discriminated against a specific class ofpeople. The plaintiffs
in Brown had the luxury of working in a much smaller business than the
women that worked at Wal-Mart nationwide. If the facts of Brown were
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taken to a national scale and the plaintiffs were still able to prove levels of
racial discrimination, there is no doubt that it would remain a successful
lawsuit. Commonality is key and unfortunately for the women of Wal-Mart,
the difficulties in proving commonality increase as the size of the class
increases. Therefore, Brown is a model of how to successfully bring a
discrimination class action that will be looked at by other circuit courts or
adopted by the Supreme Court if Nucor Corporation decides to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
William Grigas

